Market segmentation of an online auction site is studied by analyzing the users' bidding behavior.
Introduction
The internet has changed the way people communicate, work, and do business. One example are online auction sites, the largest being eBay with its more than 150 million registered users world wide [1] . An interesting aspect of eBay's success is its transparency. The market is fully transparent as the trading history of every user is disclosed to everyone on the internet. We here study the relationship between the participants of this market. A number of researches have presented statistical studies of trading [2] and analyses of bidding strategies and ending auction ending rules [3, 4] . In this contribution we focus on the market segmentation of the eBay auction site. Our approach is based on the assumption that at a certain level of abstraction the population of consumers can be separated into relatively clear-cut and homogenous sub-groups corresponding to certain customer milieus or market segments [5] . We assume that customers of the same type are described by a common pattern in their consumer interests which leads to a higher probability of bidding for the same article [6] .
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In particular, we perform a cluster analysis [7, 8] of the bidding behavior of about one million users.
Groups of eBay users with common interest or demand are detected using solely the information of which users competed in the same auctions. The classification is based on a very sparse and high dimensional data set [9] with only slightly more than 3 auctions per bidder on average (out of 1.6 million possible auctions). Conventional analysis techniques such as correspondence analysis [5, 10] have to make use of a similarity measure between articles in order to reduce the dimensionality and coarse-grain the data, such as exploiting the annotation of articles into product categories. However, this bears several pitfalls: First, the annotations are defined by the seller who lists the article such that it can be found efficiently, hence, the categorization is mainly a taxonomy. Using this to coarse-grain the data would introduce a bias in the analysis. Second, eBay categories differ largely in size when counting the number of articles in the category as well as the number of sub-categories. Correcting for this again may introduce a bias. Third, using the category taxonomy for coarse-graining induces a hierarchy in the data, as all articles below the cut in the taxonomy tree are subsumed. Fourth and most importantly, it is not clear at which level in the category tree a coarse-graining should be performed and whether this level should be the same for all branches.
Our analysis is independent of taxonomic categories and dimensionality reduction. It allows for hierarchical and overlapping cluster structures, and we find evidence for both. The product categories are solely used to interpret the results of our study, i.e. provide interest profiles of user groups found in terms of this taxonomy.
By clustering users directly according to a common demand spectrum, we also circumvent problems of conventional basket analysis done by frequent item sets [11, 12, 13, 14] . The latter asks which articles are frequently demanded by a single person. This analysis is performed for all articles averaging over the entire population of consumers and hence results in the least common denominator of articles which may then be bundled together and marketed together to the whole population of customers.
The same is true for cluster analysis of eBay categories [4] . The proposed network cluster analysis, however, reveals information about people and their diverse and possibly very special interests.
Dataset
A dataset consisting of over 1.59 million auctions was obtained from the German eBay site www.ebay.de ending during the pre-Christmas season December 6 th and 20 th 2004. Considering only articles with locations in Germany, we recorded the user-id of seller, buyer, and all bidders competing in each auction, as well as the individual bids and the product category in which the article was listed (excluding articles listed in the real estate category which was in a beta testing phase at the time). Since auctions last between 7 and 10 days depending on the choice of the seller, we thus cover a bidding period of up 4 to 25 days. We believe the pre-Christmas time is a suitable time for analysis for the following reasons: First, traffic is very high. In fact, there was a broad advertising campaign in Germany advertising to shop for Christmas presents on eBay. Second, we only considered auctions and expect that users are unlikely to bid for articles for which they cannot assess a fair price. Third, if users shop for presents, then we can gain some information about their family background, e.g. people shopping for toys will most likely have a child themselves or among their closer relatives. Our findings indicate that this is indeed the case. Table 1 summarizes the dataset in its basic parameters. There are far less sellers than bidders and only 38% of the sellers also act as bidders or buyers. This indicates that users are split into those mostly selling and those mostly buying.
User Activity and User Networks
The activity of the users is measured via the probability mass distributions of the number of articles sold p(s), bought (auctions won) p(w), and bid on p(a). Though it is possible to bid multiply in a single auction, we neglect this fact and use "bid" and "take part in an auction" synonymously. Similar to previous studies [2] , we find fat tailed distributions of the user activity in the form p(x) ∝ x −κ .
For the number of bidders b taking part in an auction, the "attractiveness of an article", we find an exponential distribution q(b) ∝ α b . Table 2 summarizes the parameters obtained by maximum likelihood fitting for these distributions [15, 16] . Plots of the data can be found in the supporting online material.
The fat tails of the distribution are striking given the short time span observed. Consider the most active bidder taking part in over 800 auctions! This user seems to follow a gambling strategy bidding only minimal amounts as he/she wins only a few of these auctions. The most successful buyer who won 201 auctions on the other hand took part in only 208 auctions. This hints at a diversity of strategies employed by users of the online auction site. Curiously, the article most desired and Table 2 : Activity distributions of observed users in auctions. Shown are the average values and the exponents κ of the tail of the distribution (x ≥ 10) if they follow a power law p(x) ∝ x −κ or the parameter α if the distribution has an exponential form q(x) ∝ α x . All parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates. From the original data a number of market networks can be constructed, such as the network of users connected by actual transactions, or the network of sellers that are connected if they have sold to (or received bids from) the same user. Then, the links in the network would represent competition or a possibility for cooperation, depending on the portfolio of articles offered by these sellers.
Here, we focus only on the bidder network based on single articles. Two bidders are linked if they have competed in an auction. Since all users that bid in a single auction are connected, this network results from overlaying fully connected cliques of bidders that result from each auction. Such graphs are also known as affiliation networks [17, 18, 19] .
Prior to a cluster analysis in this bidder network, we study its general statistical properties looking for indications of cluster structure [20] . We compare the results to a randomized null model (RNM)
obtained from reshuffling the original data, i.e. keeping the attractiveness of each auction and the activity of each bidder constant, but randomizing which bidders take part in which auction.
Furthermore, we compare the bidder network with theoretical predictions we can derive from the distribution of the bidding activity p(a) and the distribution of the attractiveness of auctions q(b).
The degree distribution of the bidder network can be calculated from p(a) and q(b) using a generating function formalism [21, 19] assuming that bidders never meet twice in different auctions. With a power-law form of p(a) ∝ a −κ and an exponential form for q(b) ∝ α b as before, the degree distribution in the bidder network amounts to:
(1) Figure 2 shows a comparison of the empirical data from the bidder network and the theoretical curve (1) . The shapes of the distributions agree quite well, given that we use an estimate based on only two parameters κ = 2.78 and α = 0.71. A theoretical expectation for the average number of neighbors in the bidder network is be given
where b is the average number of bidders per auction and a is the average number of auctions taken part in by a bidder. This estimate is in excellent agreement with the result from the RNM, but larger than in the actual data, indicating that the probability to meet in an auction twice is not zero confirming our expectation. See Table 3 for a summary of the basic parameters of the empirical data and the RNM.
Comparing the distribution of the link weights, i.e. the number of times two bidders have met in an auction, we find a much more prominent difference between the data and the RNM. Figure   2 shows that the weights of the links in the bidder network are distributed with a power law tail.
Approximately 6% of all links correspond to pairs of bidders which have met more than once. If there would be no common interest among bidders, practically all links would have weight 1 as is indeed the case for the RNM.
Additionally to the degree distribution, we compare the distribution of the clustering coefficient as a function of the degree of a node. The clustering coefficient c(k) denotes the average link density among the neighbors of a node of degree k. Due to the construction process of the network as an affiliation network, we expect that for large numbers of neighbors k the clustering coefficient c(k)
scales as k −1 in case of random assignment of bidders to auctions [18] . Figure 2 shows that this is indeed the case for the RNM, but the actual data deviates strongly for bidders with a large number of neighbors. This effect can arise from two processes: either bidders with whom one competes in two different auctions also meet independently in a third auction, or that there is an increased probability that one will compete again with a bidder one has already met once in an auction. Both explanations support our assumption of the presence of clusters of users with common interest. With these comparisons, we have shown that the bidder network is far from randomly constructed and we will proceed by studying the cluster structure for which we have found indirect evidence already.
Market Segmentation Network Clustering
The analysis of the user interests in the eBay market is based on the bidder network as constructed in the previous section. The links in this network represent articles the connected bidders (nodes) have a common interest in. We reduce the network to only those bidders that have taken part in at least two auctions and we consider only auctions with a final price below 1, 000 Euro, thereby focussing on consumer goods. See Table 3 for the basic parameters of this reduced network.
If we now find groups of users (clusters or communities [22, 23, 24] ) with a high density of links among themselves and a low density of links to the rest of the network, the total set of links within such a group of users can be interpreted as a unifying common interest of this group. We assign the users into communities as to maximize a well established quality function known as network modularity Q defined by Girvan and Newman (GN) [25] . The definition of Q can also be written as [26] :
Here, the first sum runs over all group indices s, while the second over all pairs of different group 
is minimal. Note that any assignment of bidders into groups which maximizes Q will be characterized by both, maximum cohesion of groups, and minimal adhesion between groups. If Q is maximal, every node is classified in that group to which it has the largest adhesion, otherwise it could be moved to a different group to increase Q. Additional to the original definition of Q by GN, we have introduced [ 27, 26] for examples and further details of this variation.
The technical details of how the bidders can be assigned into groups such that Q is maximized are given in Refs. [26, 23] . We allowed for maximally 500 different groups of bidders in our analysis which gives a sufficient level of detail. At the top of Figure 3 , we show the adjacency matrix ordered according to an optimal assignment of bidders into groups with γ = 0.5. Clearly, a small number of major clusters of bidders and a large number of smaller clusters are identified, strongly connected internally and well separated from one another. The largest 8 clusters are marked with letters A through H. Of all bidders in the network, 85% are classified in these 8 clusters. At the bottom, we show the same adjacency matrix, but now rows and columns are ordered according to an optimal assignment of bidders into groups with γ = 1.
As expected, we find a larger number of smaller, denser clusters which are numbered 1 through 13.
In order to analyse whether the network has a hierarchical or overlapping cluster structure, we define a consensus ordering of the bidders from the γ = 0.5 and γ = 1 ordering by reshuffling the internal order of the γ = 0.5 clusters according to the γ = 1 clustering. Remember the orderings for the two Cluster D has a number of sub-clusters, the largest of which is 7 and overlaps with cluster E through cluster 8 as before (see arrows again). Group E has two more sub-groups 9 and 10 while clusters 11, 12 and 13 fall entirely within clusters F, G and H, respectively. More details about hierarchical and overlapping cluster structures including some toy examples can be found in [26] .
Cluster Validation, Interpretation and Time Development
To validate the statistical significance and to rule out the possibility the observed cluster structure is merely a product of the clustering algorithm or the particular method of constructing the network from overlapping cliques of bidders, we compare the results to those obtained for appropriate random null models. Maximizing Q also for the RNM version of the bidder network, again taking into account those bidders which took part in at least two auctions, we find a value of Q = 0.28 at γ = 1 which is significantly less than the value of Q = 0.64 for the empirical data. Furthermore, the RNM shows all equal sized clusters, while the real network clearly possesses major and minor clusters. A random graph with the same number of nodes and links, i.e. disregarding the scale free degree distribution and the affiliation network structure of the graph, would yield only Q = 0.23 [26] .
Until now we have only found groups of bidders that have am increased probability to meet other members of their groups in the auctions they take part in. The eBay product categories are now used in order to find an interpretation for the common interests that lead to the emergence of the cluster structure of the bidder network. Since cluster sizes vary and the number of articles in the individual categories is very diverse, we calculate the odds ratios (OR) for bidding in one of the 32 main categories. This odds ratio is defined as OR Cs = P (bidding in C|member of cluster s) P (bidding in C|not member of cluster s) ,
i.e. the ratio of the odds of bidding in category C, given a bidder is member of group s vs. the odds of 11 bidding in category C given the bidder is member of any group r = s. The right hand side of Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the odds ratios for clusters A through H and most of the clusters 1 through 13. All spectra are normalized. The exact numerical values can be found in the supporting online material. Clusters from the γ = 1 assignment are more specific with less entries in the category spectrum and larger ORs.
Cluster A unites bidders interested in articles listed in the baby, beauty, fashion, books, movies and music category. Cluster 1 then represents a more specifically content oriented user group mainly interested in books, movies and music. As we have seen, cluster 1 is an almost complete sub-cluster of A. Cluster 2 is also a complete sub-cluster of A and encompasses bidders mainly interested in cosmetics and fashion.
Cluster In groups F and 11, we find predominantly practically oriented users who place their bids mainly in the categories of automotive spare parts, business and industry (where a lot of tools and machinery are auctioned) and do-it-yourself. Finally, in groups G and 12 we find event oriented customers with strong bidding activity in the tickets and travel category and in group H and 13, we find people bidding on sports equipment.
Let us now focus on the time development of the user interests. The data for this analysis was collected during only a relatively short time span (25 days) and we base our results on an extremely sparse data set. Remember that every bidder in the network took part in only 3 auctions on average. Is it really possible to predict meaningful patterns of consumer interest from such sparse data? One could further argue that the few most active bidders account for a large portion of the bids, thus holding the network together and "defining" the clusters of interest, because they also contribute a large number of links. In order to address this question, we revisited the data set in beginning of September 2005, more than nine months after our original study. From the 6 largest clusters of the γ = 1 ordering, we uniformly and randomly sampled 10, 000 users each. Note that this removes possible bias towards very active users, they are now represented in the data according to their proportion in the population.
Then we looked at the trading history of these users as far back as eBay permits -90 days. For these 60, 000 users, we determined the product categories of the articles they had bought between June and September. Again, we calculated the odds ratios, this time of buying, i.e. winning an auction, from a particular category and with the new sample of users as basic population. The results are shown on the right hand side of Figure 3 with a dashed background and the cluster id from which the users were sampled in parenthesis. The stability of the interest profiles is quite remarkable. The main interests have remained unchanged as compared to the initial study though in some cases the spectrum has become more diverse. For instance the content oriented bidders of cluster 1 now also show increased buying activity in the PC-games and tickets category. At the same time the main interest has shifted from movies to music. The largest number of product categories with increased odds of bidding in this category is found for cluster 9, the members of which are the most technology affine users anyway and which would be expected to satisfy a very broad range of consumer needs from online vendors. The members of cluster 7 (the collectors) and cluster 4 (the toy model builders)
are much more conservative and almost do not change their profile at all. Without second hand data about the age structure of the bidders classified, we can only speculate that these clusters are formed by older customers who tend to stick to particular categories.
Conclusion
We have presented a detailed study of the user behavior on the online auction site www.ebay.de Nodes in the network correspond to bidders and links to the fact that these bidders have expressed a common interest in at least one article. Studying the general statistical properties and comparing to appropriate random models, we find clear indications for a non trivial cluster structure. This cluster structure, its hierarchy and overlap was studied using a community detection algorithm. Our analysis did not need the definition of any kind of similarity measure between articles or product categories.
Rather, we solely used the taxonomic information about articles provided by eBay to interpret our 13 results. We can classify 85% of the users into only a small number of well separated, large clusters, all of which have a distinct profile of only a few main interests as revealed by annotating the articles in the taxonomy of product categories. Some of the clusters show sub-clusters or overlap with other clusters.
The interest profiles we identified are remarkably stable. Sampling randomly from the clusters and checking, what these users bought during a three month period in the summer 2005, we found that the profiles of articles bought were almost identical to those from the classification 6 months earlier.
This is striking because virtually everything is offered on eBay and one would expect users to satisfy a much broader range of shopping interests. However, it appears that the major clusters mainly correspond to people's favorite spare time activities. We believe the apparent stability of user's buying and bidding behavior reflects the permanence of their interests which is also stabilized by their social environment and activities. The clear signature in the market data may stem from the fact that users tend to buy online only articles where they have some experience and expertise in. Users seem hesitant to bid on articles from categories in which they have not previously bid in.
This may be due to the fact that inexperienced users cannot judge what is a fair price for an article in an auction and they have difficulty assessing to what extent the article offered really suits their needs. At the same time, user's interests are reinforced by online recommender systems [28, 29] , which suggest similar articles to those already bought by the user. This temporal stability corroborates the hypothesis that the presence of latent interest profiles in the society per se leads to the emergence of user groups with common interest. Transparent markets such as online auction sites in which users act independent and anonymously are perfect starting points for research into this collective behavior.
Supporting Material
User Activity The distribution of the number of articles sold per seller falls off slowest, followed by the number of articles bid on and the number of articles bought. Here, we see the professionalization on the seller side of the market. There are "power-sellers" making a living from selling via eBay, but there are hardly any "power-buyers" professionally buying on eBay. This shows that eBay is more of a selling platform than an actual trading site, where selling and buying activities would be more balanced. If we assume that the tail of the distribution of the number of articles sold per seller is representative for the "firm size" of these users and compare these to the long term statistics of firm sizes in the US given 16 by Axtell [30] , we can confirm the power law tail of the distribution, but not the exponent of κ = 2.
Instead, we find κ = 2.37 and thus the observed distribution falls off faster. We can only speculate on the reasons for this and further study is needed here to compare new and old economy. In an earlier study, Yang et al. had reported an exponent of κ = 3.5 for the distribution of the number of auctions a bidder takes part in from a data set obtained in 2001 [2] and we found κ = 2.78 in our data. If this discrepancy is the result of a trend and not due to the differences in the observed countries and sizes of the data set, and this trend holds also for the distribution of the seller's activity, then one may be able to observe a convergence towards the exponent of κ = 2 known from the old economy. 
